Introduction
Conventional firewalls are a well-established technology to protect organisations from unauthorised access and malicious attack. They rely on a restricted topology and controlled entry points to regulate the flow of information in and out of an organisation. However, in many areas of business, there is an increasing need to obtain secure communication for remote clients or employees situated outside of borders protected by the firewall. Traditionally, security management policies have been embedded in the firewall itself, and cannot be changed dynamically to match fluid circumstances caused by these groups.
Grid computing applications drive the necessity for the dynamic formation of virtual communities to the extreme. The concept of the Grid is emerging as a new approach to a high-performance distributed computing infrastructure [1] , seeking to extend the scope of distributed computing to encompass large-scale resource sharing. Underpinning the Grid is the idea of scalable virtual organisations that are dynamically created to achieve specific goals, sharing computing resources and information [2] . In [3] we illustrated via a representative example various trust requirements that need to be addressed in order to achieve a wide industry take-up of the Grid technology. Although significant effort has been undertaken in, for example, Globus [4] to provide support for secure use of resources, a comprehensive and cost-effective security management mechanism for Grids has yet to appear.
In this paper we advocate the usefulness of integrating two current lines of research. The first line is PolicyDriven Access Control [5] [6] , which treats policies as first-class objects that can be negotiated and tailored to particular roles. The second line is Distributed Firewalls [7] that support Closed User Groups providing a dynamic and distributed security infrastructure bringing together P2P collaboration and hierarchical administration. Through this fusion we expect to deliver a scalable method of setting up security infrastructures which has the benefit of allowing P2P collaboration, whilst maintaining the robustness and re-configurability of systems supplied by the central administration of the security policies.
Background
The architecture of a new distributed and secure working environment for dynamic closed user groups (CUG) without topological constraints is elaborated in [8] . This model comprises client hosts, administrator nodes and optional Trust Authorities, and its hierarchical structure provides the flexibility of both P2P information exchange and centralised server support. The administrator nodes (controlling many concurrent distributed firewalls each) are responsible for maintaining the firewall authentication policy through the creation of certificates assigned to users. Only clients possessing an appropriate certificate can be members of the a group, while new member join the group through their local administrator (LA), who has the authority to negotiate their inclusion with the remote CUG administrator (RA). All existing CUG members are informed of the arrival or departure of a client member and the CUG exists until the last member leaves, be it the creator of the group or any of the members. Separate classes of certificates are used for P2P interaction between CUG members than for administrator to client interaction. Figure 1 provides an overview of the dynamic introduction of a new member in a CUG. Normally, a client X wishing to join a different CUG B is prevented from contacting its RA. Instead X contacts RA via its local administrator LA who has to endorse X's intention to join the CUG B. If LA approves, then LA acts as a proxy client and attempts to join the CUG B on X's behalf. If RA accepts, then LA will receive a certificate for P2P client communication (C2C) within the scope of RA's group, which LA will forward to X. By possessing this certificate, X is able to participate in C2C interaction within the scope of CUG B. Notably, LA retains a degree of control over its client: First, X sees only LA and the entire client-members of the CUG B. Second, from RA's point of view, LA is the client who participates in A2C interaction for CUG B. The policy deployment model we use in the proposed integration is inspired by [6] , which is among the few approaches that address the important goal of providing a general-purpose deployment model for policies. This deployment model is associated with a policy specification framework [5] that supports access control by means of authorisation, delegation, information filtering and refrain policies. The following key concepts are most commonly used: Subject (referring to users, principals or automated manager components), Target (referring to objects accessed by a subject invoking methods visible on the target's interface) and Domain (referring to a means of grouping objects to which policies apply and partitioning the objects in a large system). In addition [5] supports the creation of groups of policies with a common semantic content or interdependency. A role is understood as the specification of the policies that apply to an organisational position and it is realised by means of a group of policies with the same subject. Roles can be related to each other giving rise to a policy oriented view of the management structure of an enterprise. In the policy deployment model (Figure 2 ), each policy type is realised as a policy class and represented by a policy object at runtime, whose methods are invoked to carry out policy management operations. The policy object maintains the state of the policy and co-ordinates all policy operations acting as single point for managing concurrent and possibly conflicting requests from multiple policy administrators and from domain objects to which the policy applies. Notably, having policy objects placed into policy object domains allows the use of policies for controlling the deployment of other policies. Policy objects entrust enforcement to separate agents, thus allowing for the concurrent enforcement of a policy over heterogeneous system entities.
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Method Integration
For the purposes of the architecture presented in this paper, we have chosen to keep the concepts of a CUG and a domain distinct. We see domains as referring to logical groups of system objects reflecting geographical boundaries or enterprise structure. We see CUGs as referring to dynamically formed contained coalitions of actors and resources -engineers, tools, data storage, etcwith a common objective. For example, actors from different enterprises may agree to form a CUG for a limited period for the purpose of distributed scientific experiment. Once the experiment is finished, the CUG may dissolve. Changes to domains on the other hand usually reflect changes to the structure of an enterprise. Figure 3 provides a pictorial overview of the method integration. In the following, we elaborate the relationships between these basic concepts. 1 The basic services of the policy deployment component are collectively realised by the CUG component through a combination of local instantiations and A2A communication.
Each administrator has its own local implementation of the policy service, which is complemented with additional P2P communication among different administration nodes. Clearly, such an approach adds administration overhead (as one may need to exchange policy specifications between administrators and generate policy objects locally), and necessitates the definition of a machine-readable policy exchange language. However, it allows decentralised policy deployment by providing the essential functionality for the exchange of local policies.
We assume an event service per local site. The event service collects and composes events from the component systems and from the managed objects in the site. Although exchange of events between different sites is not prohibited, this can be viewed as a part of interaction within a CUG that invokes the corresponding administration nodes as members of the group.
For the purpose of this presentation, we make the simplifying assumption that a conceptually unique and global domain service is realised by the underlying communication protocol. A more realistic, compatible implementation architecture is provided in [9] . Policy Objects are generated by the local policy service, and the corresponding administration nodes own them. As already elaborated, the update and exchange of policy specifications is via A2A communication. Notably, if a CUG member has a different LA than its CUG administrator (RA), then there is a choice between the LA accepting instances of the RA's policy objects, and the RA communicating policy source descriptions from which LA can locally generate the policy object instances.
A policy is enforced by the policy enforcement agents residing at each individual host that participates in a distributed firewall. Access Controllers (AC) are generated by the LAs and accommodated on the client hosts. Their primary role (in a CUG context) is preventive and proactive security policy enforcement. Policy Management Agents (PMA) are hosted at client node, but their role is to implement event-driven security policy management and reactive security enforcement. The (security) administrator, whose location is immaterial, defines the security policy and correlates it to certificates. This effectively corresponds to establishing and maintaining a mapping between certificates and roles. (See [10] for an example of such a correlation in a different context.) By informing the policy enforcement agents about this correspondence, policy-driven C2C interaction within the scope of a CUG becomes feasible. From a CUG perspective, it is worth distinguishing two logically different classes of policies: local policies and CUG policies. The former are owned and managed by a LA and apply to the clients associated with this LA. The latter are defined when each CUGs is formed and are maintained by the CUG administrator. As the proposed architecture supports A2A interaction, the LA of each client involved in a remote CUG can inform the CUG administrator about its local policies, their compliance can be checked or negotiated and conflicts can be identified and potentially treated. Notably, the scheme also allows the clients to renegotiate privileges with the administrator, and the update of firewall access policy, which is a functionality of the CUG component, can be managed by suitable event-driven obligation polices, which are supported by the policy deployment component.
Application Scenario
The following scenario provides a representative example of how using a Grid can give rise to the dynamic creation of groups of individuals and institutions sharing resources. The method integration we propose in this paper provides the basis highly suitable security management architecture for Grid applications. Notably: − CUGs can be established within and across domains.
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A system entity may initiate, join, leave or be expelled from a CUG at any time. Furthermore CUGs have separate identities and can enforce their own policies. − Policies can be enforced both at the CUG and at the local level. Their coexistence of potentially conflicting policies can be managed using meta-policies that specify precedence relationships between policies. − System entities in different roles can coexist within the same CUG and one entity can participate (potentially taking different roles) in a number of different CUGs. Member access rights and CUG security management rules can be changed by policy updates, without the need to issue new certificates for the CUG members. − CUGs can be established and extended dynamically through negotiation between administrators. CUG clients can participate on a P2P basis, with policies enforced by agents within their own local firewalls, without the need to involve the administrators. − Local administrators can act as proxies for clients within their local sites in their interaction with the CUG administration. Figure 4 illustrates a reformulation of the application scenario in the proposed architecture. We assume the following four pre-existing CUGs: CUG 1 which includes the engineer at A and the portal at B. When a user joins this group, she registers with the portal and is provided with a certificate allowing her access to the portal. CUG 2 is the CUG of data sources for which B mediates. CUG 3 is the CUG of the virtual organisation to which the engineer at A and analysis tools at D both belong. CUG 4 includes the university at D and the computational resource at E. This would have the policy that D could call on the resources of E in return for payment. When the user selects a suitable dataset, it has to be downloaded to location of her choice. A new CUG 5 may be dynamically established for this purpose. The group formation is initiated by A, who subsequently invites C and D. Since A and C may not have prior knowledge of each other, site B acts as a broker for this negotiation, informing C about A. The administration at A then initiates the issuing of short-lived certificates so that A can access C's data, and C bills A as appropriate. In this negotiation, the local administrators are involved to ensure that the negotiated policy does not contravene local policies. When D requires the assistance of resources at E, CUG 4 is used.
Conclusion and Further Work
Security management is a major obstacle to commercialising Grid infrastructures. The traditional Grid security infrastructure, such as the GRID Security Infrastructure (GSI) from Globus [11] , using the X.509 certificates as its authentication mechanism, depends on interfaces at the protocol level to provide security use of resources. This approach has concentrated so far mainly on authentication and does not cover all aspects of security management.
In [3] we identified the need to supplement this infrastructure by introducing more flexible policy-driven security and trust management mechanisms. The ultimate aim is to provide a working environment where Grid security management can be reliably, securely and efficiently automated. In order to support this we need to provide: Resource brokerage services to facilitate resource discovery and allocation in accordance to contractually specified QoS requirements. A means of publishing, negotiating and exchanging policy statements. (See [12] for preliminary results.) Trust support services, such networks of trust authorities, allowing for the dynamic formation of certification chains.
A trust management framework able to cope with the uncertainty underpinning most interactions in open dynamic systems such as the Grid. This will need to draw a distinction between perceived and actual security, to relate trust to enterprise objectives and weigh it against transaction risk. (See [13] for preliminary results.) A policy-driven security management system supporting the dynamic formation of scalable virtual organisations.
In this paper we proposed to address the latter by bringing together two current lines of research: − Policy-driven access control, where policies are identified as first-class data objects [6] , which can be negotiated and tailored to particular groups of clients. − Distributed firewalls [7] supporting Closed User Groups [8] , which facilitates P2P collaboration, whilst allowing to maintain the integrity supplied by the centralised administration of the security policies. We plan to test the applicability of the architecture on testbeds in areas such as e-Science (within CLRC's e-Science programme http://www.escience.clrc.ac.uk) or e-Business (within GRASP, an EU project exploring an infrastructure for Application Service Provision based on GRID technology. See http://www.bitd.clrc.ac.uk/Activity/GRASP ).
